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Performing Difference: Brecht, Galileo, 
and the Regime of Quotations 
Robert Miklitsch 
[I]n epic theatre (which proceeds by successive tableaux) all the 
burden of meaning and pleasure bears on each scene, not on the 
whole. At the level of the play itself, there is no meaning, no 
maturation: there is an ideal meaning (given straight in every 
tableau), but there is no final meaning, nothing but a series of 
segmentations each of which possesses a sufficient demonstrative 
power. 
-Roland Barthes, "Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein," Image/Music/Text 
(1977) 
The epic writer Dôblin provided an excellent criterion when he said 
that with an epic work, as opposed to a dramatic, one can as it were 
take a pair of scissors and cut it into individual pieces, which remain 
fully capable of life. 
-Brecht, "Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction" (1957) 
[Brecht] wanted to set the spectator at a distance from the 
performance, but in such a situation that he would be incapable of 
flight or simple enjoyment. In short, he wanted to make the 
spectator into an actor who would complete the unfinished play, but 
in real life. 
-Louis Althusser, For Marx (1965) 
Two boys climbed up a ladder, 
The one on top was somewhat smarter, 
The one below somewhat dumber. 
All at once the ladder fell. 
Robert Miklitsch teaches critical theory at Ohio University and is in the process of completing 
a book on Marxism, culture criticism, and postmodernism. 
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(Zwei knaben stiegen auf eine Leiter, 
der oben war etwas gescheiter, 
der unten war etwas dumm. 
Auf einmal fiel die Letter um.) 
-Brecht, quoting Karl Valentin, on the Fabel of Leben des Galilei 
I 
The following represents an attempt to perform a reading of Galileo true 
not so much to the "spirit" as the letter of Brecht's own critical practice as it 
is displayed in, for instance,^ Short Organum for the Theatre (1949). 
To this end (à la lettre), I have juxtaposed passages from his theoretical 
writings with my own (running) commentary on the play in order to 
dialectically recirculate and thereby problematize those canonical readings of 
the play (humanist, Marxist, deconstructive) which constitute its critical history. 
At the same time, by putting into play both the Hegelian Dialectic and the 
Classic Dilemma as well as what Jacques Derrida calls the "regime" and 
Barthes-reading Brecht-the "reign of quotations," I have also essayed to 
articulate a position "beyond" the above critical perspectives; in other words, 
a position that takes into account not only the autonomy of the work of art, 
the authority of the author and the textuality of the text, but the heterogeneity 
of the reader, her differences, his "I-slots." 
It is commonly accepted that there are at least three versions of Galileo1: 
the first was written from 1938-39 and first performed in Zurich in 1943; the 
second was written from 1944-46 and first performed in Hollywood in 1947; 
and the third~a working revision of the second-was put together from 1954-
56 and performed in East Berlin in 1957.2 In the Introduction to the Charles 
Laughton translation of Galileo, though, Eric Bentley conveniently argues that 
there are only two versions: Galileo I, "a liberal' defense of freedom against 
tyranny," and Galileo II, "a Marxist defense of a social conception of science 
against the 'liberal' view that truth is an end in itself."3 
However many versions of Galileo there in fact are (a matter of some 
dispute, as the above testifies), it is obvious that there is no original or 
definitive version-as Nietzsche would say, there is no Galileo "in itself (an 
sich). Which is to say that each Galileo is a representation: there is no 
Galileo, only "Galileo" (in quotations).4 As Brecht himself has said, "Only 
performance can decide between possible variations."5 
If, then, Galileo is undecidable, if there is no constative Galileo, no text 
with a capital T, it is impossible to postulate a Truth about the play that would 
transcend its concrete context.6 In other words, Galileo is a function of 
"Galileo" which is a function, in turn, of both socio-economic and bio-graphic, 
historical and textual traces (the last in the narrow sense). 
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II 
Speaking of bio-graphical traces, where is Brecht himself in all of this? 
Or is he a text too, his "life" a play that must be read â la lettre"! 
An anecdote about the "real" Brecht as related by Ronald Hayman in yet 
another of the latter's consummately consumable biographies of "great men of 
German letters": "Brecht had celebrated Galileo as a man whose thinking 
proceeded out of sensuality, but while he was capable of eating a box of 
chocolates in one evening, and while the number of cooks among his 
characters evidences an interest in food, generally, as Joseph Losey put it, 'he 
ate very little, drank very little, and fornicated a great deal\ . . [However,] he 
did crave for a bigger appetite."7 
Ill 
One of the critical clouds that has gathered over Galileo (as well as one 
of the reasons why it is frequently cited as one of Brecht's best plays) is the 
provocative question of whether the character of Galileo is a figure for Brecht 
himself; and, if so, to what degree Brecht's own personality is invested in the 
fictional Galileo. For example, Brecht in the play plays up Galileo's "culinary" 
appetite ("No one's virtue is completer/Great Galileo liked to eat"8) even as he 
suppresses his own and the historical Galileo's sexual one. 
Hayman's facile Freudianism aside ("[Brecht] was jealous of Laughton for 
scoring so often at the dinner table" [B 289]), why this displacement? 
My recourse to the word culinary is not, needless to say, unintentional.9 
It is well known that, true to the classic Marxist narrative of the modes of 
production, Brecht later disparaged Galileo in particular (as well as other of 
the so-called "exile plays" and the "epic theatre" in general) as "bourgeois." As 
early as 1939, Brecht wrote in his Arbeits-journal that, compared to such 
"learning plays" (Lehrstucke) as Fatzer and Bakery, Galileo was a "technical 
regression" or, more colloquially, a "step backwards."10 
Is it any surprise, then, that six years later, in 1945, Brecht tried-with the 
dubious help of the gourmand Laughtonn-to downplay the "culinary" impact 
of the 1938 Galileo in order to alienate Galileo's character even more than in 
the first version (Galileo-as-"intellectual prostitute"12) and to account for a very 
unappetizing event; an event that no doubt recollected Brecht's own seminal, 
if not traumatic experience as a medical orderly in the first World War 
(memorialized in The Legend of the Dead Soldier and later, explicitly 
thematized in the man-as-meat metaphors of Mother Courage): the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
12 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
IV 
Two autobiographical citations. The first, from A Short Organum for the 
Theatre: 
I . . . am writing this . . . on a machine which at the time of my birth 
was unknown. I travel in the new vehicles with a rapidity that my 
grandfather could not imagine; in those days, nothing moved so fast. 
And I rise in the air: a thing my father was unable to do. With my 
father I already spoke across the width of a continent, but it was 
together with my son that I saw the moving pictures of the explosion 
at Hiroshima. (BT 184) 
The second, from an Unvarnished Picture of a New Age: 
When, during my first years in exile in Denmark, I wrote The Life 
of Galileo, I was helped in the reconstruction of the Ptolemaic 
cosmology by assistants of Niels Bohr who were working on the 
problem of 'splitting' the atom. . . . [Y]ears later, I began, together 
with Charles Laughton, to prepare an American version of the play. 
The atomic' age made its debut at Hiroshima in the middle of our 
work. Overnight the biography of the founder of the new system of 
physics read differently.13 
V 
Which brings me to the heart, or guts, of this (performance) piece: How 
are we to read Brecht's revision of the 1938 Galileo? 
There are, it seems to me, three typical approaches. The first school, 
best represented by Eric Bentley, argues for what I would call the aesthetic 
scenario. Its thesis is that Galileo I-the pristine 1938 version of the play~is 
better because more "consistent," aesthetically speaking, than Galileo II. So, 
of the controversial conclusion to Galileo II, Bentley writes: "Personally I find 
the ambiguity of the earlier ending more human and more richly dramatic, as 
well as more Brechtian and more consistent with the rest of the play" (G 21). 
Despite, then, the "many small improvements" of the later version, Bentley 
"personally" prefers the earlier version of Galileo which for him-which is to 
say, in the final, New-Critical analysis-has more to offer: "more human," "more 
dramatic," "more consistent." 
In a word, more ambiguous. 
Personally, I think Bentley^ "moreness" (Mehrdeutig), his cornucopian 
aesthetics of richness and ambiguity, dramaturgy and consistency, say more 
about his own liberal humanism than about Brecht's "Galileo" 
Is Galileo I really-as Bentley contends-"more Brechtian" than Galileo II? 
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VI 
Brecht on the "spiritual dope traffic" that passes as thaëter in the 
"dramatic" playhouses: "The one important point for the spectators in these 
houses is that they should be able to swap a contradictory world for a 
consistent one" (Kleines Organonfiir das Theater [BT 188]). 
VII 
As should become evident, my allusion to the Hegelian Dialectic above 
is more parodie than strict. 
And yet, according to a certain sublative logic, the first thetic position 
(the 1938 version of Galileo) also already represents a thematic synthesis. As 
Julian H. Wulbern observes: "In the original [1938] version, with its form of 
Happy-End, the thesis, scientific truth, is opposed by its antithesis, reactionary 
suppression, which is in turn surmounted by the synthesizing force of individual 
cunning so that the truth wins out in the end."14 
The problem with this synthesis, as Brecht himself realized, is that from 
another, Marxist perspective (say Gramsci's reinscription of German Idealist 
philosophy as a "philosophy of praxis"), it is a "bad" synthesis. So, of the 1938 
Galileo, Wulbern concludes: "Philosophically, the case is closed, the lesson 
learned."15 That is, unlike Galileo II which "leaves the synthesis to the 
spectator," Galileo I and its "closed," dialectical valorization of "cunning" (List) 
is profoundly idealist. Contra Benjamin, the hero of the play is not "the 
people," a militant socious or collectivity, but consciousness, Schweikian 
consciousness, "the cunning of reason" (die List der Vernunft). 
Therefore, if Bentley s critico-descriptive categories (Galileo I/II) are not 
without force, his reading of the former, 1938 version of the play as "a 'liberal' 
defense of freedom against tyranny" is moot, to say the least. The theme of 
"cunning" privileged in Galileo I in fact problematizes just such a unilateral 
reading not simply because it puts liberalism as such into quotations-as even 
Bentley, admittedly, does-but because Brecht posits it as a thesis that must in 
turn be superseded. To wit: in Galileo I, liberalism is simultaneously 
preserved (Bentley's position) and destroyed. 
VIII 
"The epic drama, with its materialistic standpoint and its lack of interest 
in any investment of its spectators' emotions, knows no objective but only a 
finishing point, and is familiar with a different kind of chain, whose course 
need not be a straight one but may quite well be in curves or even in leaps" 
(Berlin 1931 [BT 45]). 
20 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
IX 
If the first school of readers argues that Galileo I is better, because an 
aesthetically more "integrated work of art" (Gesamtkunstwerk) than Galileo II, 
the second school-best represented by Brecht himself-argues for what I would 
call the authorial, or developmental, scenario: Galileo II succeeds Galileo I and 
thus "reflects" the author's maturation as a Marxist (artist).16 
In other words, if Galileo I is ultimately Hegelian, Galileo II (the 1947 
version of the play) can be said to be antithetical in that it turns Galileo I on 
its head: materialist, it negates the thesis-or "negative," thematic synthesis-of 
its idealist predecessor. "The 'foundation of the thaëter,'" John Willet writes 
in his editorial notes to "Der Messingkauf," involves "the standing on its head 
of the traditional notion of the theatre in order to meet the Philosopher's 
demands, the Philosopher being quite plainly a Marxist" (BT 171). Or, as 
Brecht himself wrote, recollecting not so much the Marx of The German 
Ideology as of the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The theatre became an 
affair for philosophers, but only for such philosophers as wished not just to 
explain the world but to change it" (BT 72). 
From this antithetical perspective (which is not distinguishable from a 
certain classical Marxism), Galileo II is less bourgeois than Galileo I-in 
Brecht's own terms, less empathetic, less mimetic, less static. 
In a word: less Aristotelian. 
The post-Galilean, not to say non-Aristotelian Brecht, the Brecht who, 
post Galileo, wanted to write a play called the Life of Einstein: 
Even when a character behaves by contradictions that's only because 
nobody can be identically the same at two unidentical moments. 
Changes in his exterior continually lead to an inner reshuffling. The 
continuity of the ego is a myth. A man is an atom that perpetually 
breaks up and forms anew." {Die Literarische Welt, Berlin 1926 [BT 
15]) 
XI 
Is less more or more-well-more, better, "more Brechtian"? 
More specifically: Which is "more Brechtian," Galileo I, Bentle/s 
privileged version and its aesthetics of plenty, of ambiguity and consistency, or 
Galileo II, Brecht's, that is to say the "authorized" version and its "epic" 
economy, a dialectic of gests and negations, "leaps" and V-effects 
(Verfremdungseffekte) ? 
FALL 1991 21 
However, this question posed, another question-/?0C£ both Bentley and 
Brecht himself-remains: How useful is it to read "Galileo" from such an 
intentional perspective, as if "Brecht" unequivocally possessed himself as a 
subject; as if "Brecht" himself were not a construction, what Foucault calls an 
"author function"; as if, in other words, "Brecht" himself were not a 
contradiction, like "Galileo" himself?17 
From this improper perspective, Brecht's "own" theory must be submitted 
to a certain grammatological practice, what Derrida calls "the regime of 
quotations."18 Put another way, Brecht's apparently authoritative writings on 
the theatre—in particular his "own" author-invested readings of Galileo I and 
II-are neither more nor less simple than the plays, even a supposedly 
backward, "bourgeois" play such as "Galileo" 
Thus a certain critical question-Which is better, the drama-rich 1938 
Galileo or the ambiguity-poor 1947 version?-is a red herring, bad bait for 
cunning humanists and correct Marxists, subaltern students and dogmatic 
schoolmasters. 
XII 
Brecht, in 1926, on Shaw's heroes: "heroism consists of an impenetrable 
but exceedingly lively hotchpotch of the most contradictory qualities" ("Ovation 
fur Shaw," Berliner Bôrsen-Courier, 1926 [BT 11-12]). 
XIII 
If the "author" should be understood, according to Foucault, as a site 
traversed by "a series of specific and complex operations . . . [that] can give 
rise simultaneously to several . . . subjects-positions that can be occupied by 
different classes of individuals,"19 then even "Brecht" himself does not have the 
last word on "Galileo" and its meaning. Though his intention is not irrelevant 
(in fact, it is an inescapable element of the play's irreducibility), "the authority 
of the author must be content," as Gayatri Spivak has said, "to stand in the 
wings."20 
This said, how can one reconcile Brecht's polemical understanding of 
Galileo II (e.g., "Galileo's crime can be regarded as the 'original sin' of 
modern natural sciences" [F 340]) with the audience's "own" very different, 
sympathetic reception of it?21 More to the point, if~from a strict "epic" 
standpoint-the audience over-identifies with the figure of Galileo (as it 
frequently does with Mother Courage), what exactly is the economy of 
"Galileo"? 
Is it possible that the play of representation between Galileo I and 
Galileo II is an instance of a more general difference, a différance that exceeds 
the authority of the author as well as the not necessarily untutored response 
of the reader/audience; a différance that neither position can claim to 
22 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
comprehend or only at the expense of "Galileo" and its rewriting of Galileo's 
"life" as history (where history is not simply opposed to story, the Imaginary to 
the Real, etc.)?22 
XIV 
Of his experience of rewriting Galileo with Laughton, Brecht referred to 
it once in conversation as "a piece of fun that lasted two years" (ein zweijàhriger 
Spass [BT 168]). Macht es Spassl 
XV 
Let me put this in "paedagogical" terms.23 Anyone who has taught Galileo 
and who has broached the subject of Brecht's seemingly endless revision of it 
knows that, in the classroom, the play frequently takes on the characteristics 
of the Classic Dilemma. 
Thus, even if students recognize that the figure of Galileo is neither 
wholly virtuous nor wholly meretricious, they are usually not very comfortable 
with the play's unusually prickly horns ("One can scarcely wish only to praise 
or only to condemn Galileo" [B 340]). Invariably, they plump down on one 
side of the fence or the other. According to a binary moral logic that binds 
and blinds student readers despite Brecht's "epic-dialectical" devices, they tend 
to feel/think that Galileo is either a hero or a coward, a contributor or 
collaborator; a determination that would seem to conform to the "natural," 
diametrical opposition between "emotion" (Einfuhlung) and "reason" 
(Verstand). 
In the parlance of the Hollywood western, Galileo wears either a white 
or black hat. 
XVI 
A painter or a poet, a poet~as Frisch said-more like a scientist than a 
poet, "without incense": "In spite of the fact that he was anything but a 
colorless person, [Brecht] loved the color gray, not the opaque gray of 
obscurity, but the sober gray of the theoretician, commentator, and 
schoolmaster."24 
XVII 
If Galileo I is a thesis of sorts and Galileo II its antithesis (the aesthetic 
and authorial schools respectively), the third school argues for what might be 
called the synthetic scenario, a post-Hegelian, albeit non-Marxist posture that 
allows one to read "Galileo" as both a "liberal' defense of freedom against 
tyranny" and "a Marxist defense of a social conception of science." According 
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to this school (which is indistinguishable from a certain instance of American 
deconstruction), it is impossible to privilege any particular version or 
performance of "Galileo" since the play deconstructs itself (where, for example, 
the grammar of Marxism puts into abyss the rhetoric of Aesthetics, and vice 
versa). 
Yet if this is in fact true, if "Galileo" institutes a textual semiosis that 
cannot be "spiritualized" (aufgehoben), whose abyssal logic by-steps the 
omnivorous jaws of the Hegelian Dialectic as well as the Scylla and Charybdis 
of the Classic Dilemma, how does this position account for contradiction, for 
the asymmetrically loaded social and historical context in which the play is 
both inscribed and produced, reproduced and re-inscribed? 
More importantly, if a certain deconstructive reading of the opposition 
Galileo I/II replays rather than transforms the terms of the former "moments" 
(Hegelian/Marxist), is it possible to "portray" (abbilden) another position~a 
position "beyond," that is, a certain humanism (the speculative-derived theme 
of "individual cunning"), a certain Marxism (a politicization of literature that 
is a mirror antithesis of the former's aestheticization of politics), and a certain 
deconstructionism (a general theory of reading that, endlessly rewriting the 
political and the aesthetic as signifiers, effectively neutralizes whatever 
significance "Galileo" might~as a text-possess)? 
XVIII 
Marx, the early Marx, as Copernicus (or, according to Andrea, 
Kippernikus25): "The criticism of religion disillusions man so that he may think, 
act and fashion his own reality as a disillusioned man come to his senses; so 
that he may revolve around himself as his real sun."26 
XIX 
Precisely at this point I would submit that it is necessary to read "Galileo" 
differently not simply because there are different versions (a tempo-empirical 
as opposed to textual effect typical of plays) but because its performativity-the 
differential play between Galileo I and II-encourages the reader or, more 
generally, the audience to reconsider its particular subject-position. 
And this subject-position, as we know from Brecht, is neither a uniform 
nor universal one: the reader is no ideal, imperial subject but the product of 
a heterogeneous social text, what Brecht calls the "joke of contradiction." Put 
another way: the authority of the author-the autonomy of Brecht's "epic 
theatre" and its "alienation effects"--is not absolute but relative. One must 
therefore put into play both Brecht's and one's "own" subject-position in order 
to attend to the letter of the text, a historio-grap/nc materialism that may or 
may not "reflect" the spirit of the author and/or reader. 
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All of which is to say that the political interest of "Galileo" can only be 
articulated on the local level, at that point where-face to face with the text and 
its differential play~the reader positions himself as a subject. Thus, because 
it challenges the reader to question the author's considerable authority as well 
as answer for his/her "own" subject position-a political effect that is an 
indispensable part of Brecht's genuinely radical project--"Ga///<?o" points up the 
undecidable ethical context in which the reader must, ultimately, stake out a 
position, materialize, decide. 
In a word, act. 
XX 
A "painterly" passage from Hegel, who-according to Brecht--"had the 
greatest comic talent among all philosophers": "When philosophy paints its 
gray on gray it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of 
Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk."27 
XXI 
Pedagogically speaking, in Brecht's sense of pedagogy, "Galileo" is not, 
then, a "step backwards"; "Brecht" himself aside, it has a general political force 
equal to the more properly "didactic" plays (Lehrstiicke) of the 20s.23 Though 
it may be "conservative" in that it does not put into play the "grand pedagogy" 
(grosse Pàdogogik) that Brecht dreamed of,29 the built-in give-and-take of the 
"lesser pedagogy" (kleine Pàdogogik) is not necessarily a bad thing. 
In "Conversations with Brecht," Walter Benjamin records Brecht as 
saying: "Tt is a good thing to be overtaken in an extreme position [read "grand 
pedagogy"] by a reactionary epoch. That way you reach a middle position/"30 
The strategic, situational necessity of this middle position-which is also the 
reader's position-is neither a logical conclusion nor golden mean: not a 
position "in the center," "equally distant from either end." 
Rather, this middle position signifies the in-between, a site that displays 
the semiosis of signification even as it permits the reader to re-mark his "I-
slot" or subject-position, her status as both a citational subject and ethico-
political agent, what Julia Kristeva calls the subjet en procès ("subject in 
process/on trial").31 
XXII 
In a late, posthumously published appendix to A Short Organum for the 
Tlieatre, Brecht wrote, dramatically re-writing Hegel's Prussianized, or "righted" 
philosophy: "In times of upheaval, fearful and fruitful, the evenings of the 
doomed classes coincide with the dawns of those that are rising. It is in these 
twilight periods that Miverva's owl sets out on her flights" (BT 227). 
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XXIII 
To re-mark Brecht's "own" subject-position, one might say that 
"Galileo"-Galileo in quotations-dramatizes the dictatorial imagination at work 
behind or, in this case, between the scenes. In other words, the human, not to 
say human all-too-human hand of Brecht is clearly, even obtrusively, visible in 
"Galileo" a hand that continually disturbs the still glassine water of theatrical 
illusion even as it disrupts the specular autonomy of the New Criticism, the 
spectral party-correct "materialism" of classical Marxism, and the spectacular 
neo-formalism of the New New Criticism.32 
The spectacle-in the fazed, broken world of Brecht's thaëter-vrill not 
stand still for the spectator. 
Still, the "epic theatre" never quite materializes. Neither a "grand" nor 
"lesser pedagogy," neither "dialectical" nor "bourgeois," neither dawn nor dusk, 
"Galileo" is-in the last, interminable instance—a contradiction in terms and 
defies even Brecht's "own" remarkable signature. Unsigned, alienated from the 
authority of its non-Aristotelian author {nichtaristotelische Dramatik)y it 
represents a "cunning" interval between pleasure and instruction, identification 
and distance, between-in other words-a "culinary" and "smoking theatre" or, 
from a more general perspective, a certain Marxism and a certain humanism. 
Thus in-between, twilit, "Galileo" deserves to be read in quotations. At 
the same time, if one is not to privilege the semiosis of signification at the 
expense of the text's politico-historical significance, "Galileo" demands to be 
read differently; that is, it demands to be re-written according to the changing, 
even conflicting lights of the subject and his/her positions, whether "above" or 
"below," "fearful" or "fruitful," "brighter" (gescheiter) or "dimmer" (dumm). 
Boston, Massachusetts 
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